University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
11-1999

Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort
Liability
Charles W. Mooney Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Economics Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Torts
Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons

Repository Citation
Mooney, Charles W. Jr., "Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability" (1999).
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1289.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1289

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Judgment Proofing, BanL�1ptcy Policy,
and the Dark Side of Tort Liability
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*
One need not be an astute student of the law of obligations to appreciate
Professor Schwarcz's comprehensive rebuttal of Professor LoPucki's recent
articles on judgment proofing.t Schwarcz argues compellingly that judgment
proofing is not likely to occur in arm's length contexts. Although judgment
proofing may be more likely in non-arm's length situations, he also demon
strates persuasively that current doctrine is up to the task without the need for
additional regulation.
Schwarcz correctly observes that the principal potential victims of judg
ment proofing are involuntary (i.e., tort) creditors of business debtors.2
However, neither Schwarcz nor LoPucki gives much attention to the signifi
cance of the underlying policies or characteristics of tort liability to the mat
ter of judgment proofing.J My observations address tort claims in this con
text.

I shall not devote my brief allotted space to a broad critique of the

Schwarcz-LoPucki dialogue. Instead, this essay outlines a different path for
future scholarship and policy debates.

In particular, that path must pay at

tention to both the nature and effects of tort liability.
Schwarcz and LoPucki both proceed on the implicit assumption that tort
claimants, even claimants against insolvent (judgment proof) debtors, should
be paid. Addressing debtors that cannot pay, however, inevitably implicates
bankruptcy policy. In my view, the purpose of the bankruptcy system should
be the enforcement of legal rights against a debtor in financial distress.
Bankruptcy is a branch of civil procedure-a judicial process in which legal
rights and entitlements are determined and remedies are provided.4 Accord-

*

Interim Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Essential Structure ofJudgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also Lynn M.
LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998); James J. White,
Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki 's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE
I.

L.J.1363 (1998).
2.

See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 4-5 & nn.13-14.

3. This is not necessarily a criticism; neither set out to examine tort law.
4. "Bankruptcy is civil procedure-no less but absolutely no more." Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,

Hosing Down Senior Claims with a Quicker and Dirtier Chapter 11, 72 WASH.U. L. Q. I 153, 1158
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ingly, the creation and attributes of the legal rights that bankruptcy should
enforce are detem1ined primarily by nonbankruptcy state and federal law.
These rights include property rights, claims in contract and tort, governmen
tal interests such as claims for taxes and fines, zoning restrictions, licensing
requirements, and most other legal relationships with a debtor, such as the
interests of the debtor's shareholders, partners, and employees.

As a first

principle, then, Schwarcz's and LoPucki 's intuitions are correct insofar as
tort claimants have legally enforceable claims.
When a debtor is insolvent it is sometimes appropriate to apply different
rules in the interest of maximizing the recoveries of those with legal entitle
ments or to achieve other normatively desirable goals.

One set of insol

vency-based rule changes is the body of doctrine generally known as
"fraudulent transfer." Under both Bankruptcy Code section 548 and the Uni
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (and the earlier Uniform Fraudulent Convey
ance Act), obligations incurred for less than "reasonably equivalent value"
("fair consideration," under the earlier act) are avoidable if they are incurred
while the debtor is insolvents A voidance based on the inadequacy of value,
as opposed to actual fraudulent intent, is often called "constructive" fraud.
Although there may be no consensus on the precise normative basis for
avoiding transfers of property or the incurrence of obligations by an insol
vent debtor for less than reasonably equivalent value, there does seem to be a
general consensus that fraudulent transfer law, including the constructive
fraud rules, should be retained.6
Note that the constructive fraud doctrine appears to catch some purely
innocent behavior that has the effect of damaging an insolvent debtor's
creditors (by taking away assets or by giving rise to a competing obligation).?
(1994) (commenting on Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford,

Compensating Unsecured
Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.1133 (1994)).
5. I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i) (1993 & Supp. 1999); UNJF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §
5(a) (1984); UNJF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918). There are triggers other than in

solvency that also will invoke fraudulent transfer doctrine.

See. e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II)

(1993 & Supp. 1999) (debtor "engaged . .. or . . . about to engage in business or a transaction, for
which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital"); I I U.S.C. §
548(a)( l )(B)(ii)(III) (1993 & Supp. 1999) (debtor "intended to incur . . . debts that would be beyond
the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured"). References in this essay to "insolvent" or "in
solvency" are intended to embrace these other triggers as well.
6. For example, David Carlson questioned the economic efficiency of fraudulent transfer law,
but concluded nonetheless that the doctrine is supportable on non-efficiency-based normative
grounds-it is wrong to take assets away from creditors and give them to others.

See David Gray
Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643 (1987). Some, how
ever, have questioned the wisdom of applying fraudulent transfer law in specific contexts. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38
Carlson,

V AND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
7. "The most important aspect of the original 1915 statute [the Uniform Fraudulent Convey
ance Act] was that it codified in fraudulent conveyance law a concept usually called 'constructive
fraud ' or 'presumptive fraud. '

Both terms are misnomers because the new concept permitted a

creditor to avoid-to set aside-a transfer

even though the debtor was entirely innocent of any

Nov.
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Stated otherwise, under constructive fraud doctrine a creditor normally
should not be allowed to claim an amount that is substantially greater than
the value that the creditor has contributed to the debtor.
Many-possibly most-tort claims incurred by an insolvent tortfeasor
appear to meet the test for avoidability under fraudulent transfer law. When
the debtor's tort liability appears it is unaccompanied by any corresponding
asset.8 Had counsel for the debtors and non-tort creditors pursued this path,
the results in huge bankruptcies involving mass tort claims in recent years
might have been radically different. Forewarned of this theory, counsel for
debtors and non-tort creditors who fail to pursue it in the future may act at
their peril.9

On the other hand, arguments typically are not made that tort

claims, as opposed to contractual claims, may be avoidable on a fraudulent
transfer theory. This is surprising, especially because Bankruptcy Code section 548 is so compellingly clear.Jo

·

There is a second aspect of tort liability that may bear on how seriously
we take the potential for judgment proofing. Simply put, there is no consen
sus on why tort liability exists or what tort law is about.

The principal ra

tionales are deterrence, justice, and compensation.11 If critics are correct that

fraudulent intent. The statute defined circumstances in which the transfer was regarded as unfairly
disadvantageous to the debtor 's creditors, regardless of intent. . . . " ELIZABETH WARREN & ]A Y
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 162 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis
added).
8. The analysis will not always be so simple, however. For example, one injured by a defec
tive product may have paid the price for the product, thereby giving
difficult questions may arise as to

some value to the debtor. Also,

when a tort obligation is incurred.

9. Steven Harris and I warned of this possibility in a footnote in a 1994 article.
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A

See Steven L.
Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors·

Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2066 n. l 34 (1994).
10. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act may be less clear, as its drafters apparently may not
have thought about tort claims as obligations affected by the statute.

See UNIF. FRAUDULENT

TRANSFER ACT§ 6(5) (1984) (providing the time when an obligation is incurred if the obligation is
"oral" or "evidenced by a writing," perhaps suggesting that the drafters were not thinking of tort
claims as obligations).
Note that the idea of subordinating tort claims in bankruptcy flies against arguments that con
tract claims-even

secured contract claims-should be subordinated to tort claims in bankruptcy.
See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565,
1646-1650 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor 's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887,
1908-14 (1994). Avoiding tort claims under fraudulent transfer law would exacerbate the negative
externalities considered by Leebron and LoPucki, to be sure.

But honoring many types of tort

claims likewise does substantial violence to the egalitarian (and other) goals of fraudulent transfer
law.

This violence should not be ignored.

Perhaps it is time for torts scholars and bankruptcy

scholars to join forces in exploring how to rationalize competing interests and norms.
II. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW (1993); Stephen R. Perry,
Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David Owen, ed.
1995). For a brief critique of the deterrence theory, see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,

Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security
Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1366-68 (1997).

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

76

[Vol. 52:73

deterrence is a weak justification for tort liability, 12 deterrence must be an
even weaker rationale in the case of an insolvent debtor. The debtor has no
equity to lose!

Moreover, inasmuch as fraudulent transfer doctrine will be

invoked only in cases of insolvent debtors, application of that doctrine to tort
liabilities may not present an unreasonable disruption of justice- and com
pensation-based conceptions of tort law.

This is not the place to analyze

fully tort theory or the normative comparisons between contract liabilities
and tort liabilities.

But if judgment proofing against tort liability is a con

cern, the nature of that liability cannot be ignored.
Finally, the wealth effects of tort law must be considered. Schwarcz ar
gues against radical restrictions or regulatory responses to judgment proofing
concerns which could "indiscriminately restrict the value creation-'wealth,
jobs, incomes, and new products for large numbers of people'-that comes
with business and financial innovation."I3 The contours of tort law itself also
may be restricting the creation of wealth.

As we know it in the United

States, tort law is wasteful and in general poorly compensates some victims
while drastically overcompensating others (and rewarding their lawyers).
Few would doubt that as a society we should provide for those who have
been injured.

But that position does not require a defense of current doc

trine.14
The relationship between tort law and fraudulent transfer law is an im
portant, albeit largely unnoticed, aspect of how tort claims-including mass
torts-are dealt with in bankruptcy.

This dark side of tort liability is its

negative impact on the other creditors of an insolvent tortfeasor.

It seems

clear enough that a new debate should emerge about the effects of tort claims
when viewed through the goals underlying tort law, fraudulent transfer law,
and ban.lcruptcy policy.

12.

See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 3-24

(1989).
13. Schwarcz, supra note I, at 53 (citing Paul Craig Roberts, Who Did More for Mankind,
Mother Teresa or Mike Milken?, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 28).
14. Professor Sugarman launched one of the most trenchant critiques of current doctrine and
its commonly-asserted justifications.
accident-reduction scheme.

In its place he proposed an alternative compensation and

See SUGARMAN, supra note 12.

